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Many Worlds Ethics.

Storrs McCall proposes a model of the universe in which the future is understood to
branch into many worlds. The future is thus radically different than the past. This
model provides a most useable platform for addressing a diversity of theoretical and
practical problems in relation to architectural ethics. The paper discusses one
dimension of this: the design ethics of Daniel Libeskind’s scheme for the
reconstruction of New York Ground Zero. In post-Enlightenment ethics, Hume’s law
asserts that there is no deductive relation between whatever “is” in the real world and
whatever other things and conditions “ought” to be in it. There are no ethical facts,
only moral acts. This leaves no grounds for architecture to be reckoned either as
ethical or unethical in its own terms. But if we accept that the future branches into
many worlds, then it can be argued that every architectural proposition of reasonable
complexity (or every copulation of propositions as Hume puts it) also branches in the
present in an explosion of alternative interpretations. A design can be judged to be
ethical in terms of how it addresses this alterity of future worlds. Our agenda should
be to critique the probable futures in a design proposal, and to promote those other
futures that are perceived as desirable but are as yet only barely possible.

Michael Linzey
University of Auckland
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MANY WORLDS ETHICS
Storrs McCall proposes a model of the universe in which the future is understood to branch into
many worlds. The future is thus radically different than the past. This model provides a most
useable platform for addressing a diversity of philosophical and physical problems in relation to
architectural ethics. The paper discusses one dimension of this: the design ethics of Daniel
Libeskind’s scheme for the reconstruction of New York Ground Zero. In post-Enlightenment ethics,
Hume’s law asserts that there is no deductive relation between whatever “is” in the real world and
whatever other things and conditions “ought” to be in it. There are no grounds for architecture to be
reckoned either as ethical or unethical in its own terms. There are no ethical facts, only moral acts.
But if we accept that the future branches into many worlds, then it can be argued that every
architectural proposition of reasonable complexity (or every copulation of propositions as Hume
puts it) also branches in the present in an explosion of alternative interpretations. A design can be
judged to be ethical in terms of how it addresses this alterity of future worlds. Our agenda should
be to critique the probable futures in a design proposal, and to promote those other futures that are
perceived as desirable but are as yet only barely possible.

The future places an ethical limit on architecture in two senses. Firstly, when architecture is viewed
as if it were history, or when architects attempt to design a seamless archive with the past, then
architectural work can often lose that lively sense that it has of a radically fragmented future
condition. The future is the end point of history, and this is a limitation that historicist architecture
often also shares with sustainable architecture. Secondly the future is the “end” of architectural
design both as teleology and in a narrative sense. The designer “closes the book” on a seemingly
limitless spectrum of future possibilities. The “end” of designing in this second sense represents for
us the last opportunity to tell a story, while to limit exploitative excesses in some probable futures
and to promote less likely but more desirable alternative futures is also the ethical purpose of
telling it.
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This paper extends some thoughts about architectural ethics that I presented to the inaugural
Design Research Symposium at Wellington (Linzey 2003). There I discussed an ethical agenda for
design research in terms of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil. Neitzsche described certain
creative artists as “philosophers of the future”. I argued in the paper that this term “philosophers of
the future” can be understood in part to imply a new future-directed meaning for mimesis. In all the
classical versions of mimesis the action is invariably tensed either towards the past or the present.
Art imitates life. Form follows function. But Nietzsche proposed that artists in the future will
“attempt” life. Art attempts life is to say that mimesis is also capable of directing itself forwards in
the future tense. This kind of future-oriented philosophy of art will be effected through what
Nietzsche called the will to power of the artist.
A new species of philosopher is appearing. I venture to baptize these philosophers with
a name not without danger in it. As I divine them, as they let themselves be divined – for
it pertains to their nature to want to remain a riddle in some respects – these
philosophers of the future might rightly, but perhaps also wrongly, be described as
attempters. This name itself is in the end only an attempt and, if you will, a temptation
(Nietzsche 1886: §42).
I now want to turn attention to a contemporary “philosopher of the future”, who is however not an
artist but a logician. Storrs McCall’s philosophical subject matter embraces among other things a
theory about the real multiplicity of worlds in the future (McCall 1994). McCall is a “philosopher of
the future” also in a second sense alluded to by Nietzsche, namely he is a philosophical realist. He
conceives the branched model as an attempt to access that objective reality which quantum
science time and again has demonstrated is not at all the way that anybody has yet conceived it to
be. He recognizes, as philosophical realists do, that any models at all, even including the “laws of
nature” themselves as they are presently conceived, are only an approximation of the “reality” that
lies beyond models (McCall 1995: 285). Our models resemble reality in the way that a can opener
might be said to resemble the beans hidden inside a tin can. C. S. Peirce, who was in many
respects the father of modern scientific realism, said, “By their fruits you shall know them!” (Peirce
1998: 401). All of the future branches in McCall’s model are scientifically real, although only one of
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them turns out in the long run to be actual (McCall 2004). This situation with many worlds is
analogous for example with Richard Feynman’s description of quantum electrodynamics in which a
particle really takes every possible path from A to B but in an experimental apparatus only one
path is actually taken (Feynman 1985).
In its original sense, ethics meant the habits and codified rules of behaviour that enabled a diverse
group of ethnic tribes and families to live together in relative harmony as and within the classical
Greek polis or city-state. The idea of poliphilia or love for the city was an essential component of
this meaning of ethics. In classical times the city was an ethical fact. Zeno of Citium said that every
corporeal fact can be classed as either good or bad or indifferent. His student Cleanthes of Assos
argued that a city is morally good if it is the seat of justice. Justice is a fundamental fact of human
morality, and so too the physical seat of justice is a moral fact. In response to Aristotle’s formalist
argument to the effect that a city is only the people, and the abstract forms of political organisation,
Cleanthes replied that city is said in three ways, as the people, as the physical construction, and as
“both of these”. The physical architecture of a living city is an ethical fact. This argument is spelled
out in detail in the ethical epitome of Arius Didymus which was a textbook of political/ethical theory
written at the beginning of the period in history that we know today as pax romana (Pomeroy 1999,
Schofield 1999, Linzey 2004). In the classical world, and particularly during that highly productive
interval, the architecture of Rome and every other city was judged among other things in terms of
its moral worth. Oikonomia or ethical stewardship was a third part of the education of Roman
architects, according to Vitruvius.
These ethical foundations of architectural theory lost ground after the Reformation. By the time of
the Enlightenment, modern theories of ethics were almost entirely subjective, couched in terms of
personal moral sensibility and a notion of intersubjective empathy. In David Hume’s view no
reasonable ethical judgments could be sustained about inert matter or matters of fact, since “An
active principle can never be founded on an inactive” (Hume 1774, p. 167). Nietzsche said much
the same thing, “There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena”
(Nietzsche 1886, § 108). The mere facts, the mere physical phenomenon of architecture, can have
no ethical consequences in itself except as a sign of moral sentiment in a human agent. For there
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is no rational connection, in Hume’s view, between objective knowledge of what “is” and moral
sentiments about what “ought to be” the case. Statements of future obligation cannot be deduced
from statements of historical fact.
McCall’s model provides a realistic basis for breaking this modern stranglehold of intersubjective
ethics. Since every uniformity of nature, every historical copulation of “is” and “is not”, terminates in
the present with an explosion of future possibilities, and not just possible objects but possible
worlds, therefore a statement of what architecture “ought to be” naturally follows from a perception
and understanding of what it is. Architecture is the creatrix of space (Schmarsow 1893), and the
medium through which human relations are given dimension (Sorkin 2003). Every space that
architecture creates is a little world. In McCall’s model its future is many worlds. The ethical role of
architecture therefore is to create a space that contains, so far as imaginatively possible, an ethical
response to every real future world. The model enables us to view architecture not just as a sign of
human agency (reflecting the doubtful moral sensibility of the principal architect, or less clearly the
collective ethic of the employed practitioners whom the principal often only nominally represents,)
but rather as an active ethical force in its own right, and a lively agent of world-making. Architecture
itself is the ethical agent. Every spatial idea that it embodies is an ethical proposition about the
fragmented future. We may judge a work of architecture in relation to the many worlds that really if
not actually will receive its agency. The plurality of ethne, the tribes and families of classical ethics,
is substituted in this model by a plurality of worlds.
McCall is a “philosopher of the future”, but he is not an artist, an architect or a design theorist.
Therefore it is necessary to supplement the present discussion in order to draw out its implications
for architectural design. To this end I introduce Daniel Libeskind into the argument, Libeskind being
an exemplary “philosopher of the future” who operates in the field of architecture and urban design.
I propose in particular to criticise Libeskind’s master plan design for New York Ground Zero in
terms of McCall’s branched model of scientific realism. This 2003 work by Studio Daniel Libeskind
will serve to illustrate that architectural ideas can operate productively in a design for the future that
is conceived as a real multiplicity of worlds.
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Libeskind’s design was an ethical response to a situation of global trauma. The events of
September 11 were doubtless traumatic. Jean Baudrillard described the collapse of the towers of
the World Trade Centre in New York as “unimaginable”, even although it certainly happened
(Baudrillard 2002). Just because the events of September 11 really happened, he said, this in itself
is not enough to make them a “real event”. The real and the fictional seem to have become
confused for Baudrillard, traumatised by the surplus of terrorist violence. Mark Wigley argued that
the twin towers were already an image of “sublime excess” even before they were destroyed
(Wigley 2002), and this may be why the trauma of their destruction was so apparently
unfathomable. We can learn from this event, Wigley observed, that “buildings are much stranger
than we are willing to admit.” In a situation of trauma, people turn to architects (or is it that we turn
to architecture?) looking for answers. One strident critic of Libeskind’s design proposal, Michael
Sorkin, wrote:
Since 9/11, images of assaults on buildings and cities have become ubiquitous symbols
of political action, surrogates—in a war without corpses—for our own corporeality. As
we watch the war on Iraq unfolding in real time on TV, we are introduced to a modified,
militarized, urbanists’ discourse, different from our own, but filled with mirror images of
architecture’s techniques. (Sorkin 2003)
These commentaries represent some of the stakes, the issues that have emerged out of the
factual event of Ground Zero. Perhaps we see through this rhetoric and also that of the
warmongers that Ground Zero has caused a stirring towards the classical in terms of the theory of
architectural ethics. Was it indeed the city that was traumatized, or the theory of the city? Is man
indeed the political animal that Aristotle claimed, or is it Cleanthes’s city animated by men?
In 2002 the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation organised a limited competition for a plan
to rebuild the site of the tragedy. The brief called for a “vision” that would make Lower Manhattan
“a destination for the whole world.” I want to argue that the competition winner, Studio Daniel
Libeskind, presented an ethical vision for the future redevelopment. I also happen to believe that it
was the most ethical of the nine competing proposals, although there is not sufficient space here to
develop this line of criticism (Kogod and Osman 2003).
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It was never going to be an option simply to leave Ground Zero as an unadorned memorial to
terror. The world would have read this (macabre destination for tourism) as an abdication to
Osama Bin Laden, in the same way that other burned out architectural memorials, the Peace Park
at Hiroshima for example, symbolise political and architectural abdication to America, and in fact
American xenophobia. Nor was it going to be sufficient simply to rebuild the towers, to repair and
replicate Yamasaki’s original work. This would have been an abdication of a different sort – to the
political right and also to architectural historicism. George W. Bush said that “the evildoers ... have
hurt our buildings,” or so Mark Wigley reports. But simply to repair the hurt would not have been
enough to relieve the trauma. We will remember Ground Zero as a symbol of the dangerous kind
of xenophobia that nowadays appears to be concomitant with globalisation. But for the citizens of
Lower Manhattan it was also an intolerable memory of a personal trauma. An unbuilt Ground Zero
would have been a daily reminder that the future is all too susceptible to chance events. But on the
other hand simply to rebuild the towers (even in the form that the THINK team proposed) would
only have drawn a charade of “business as usual” over the yawning abyss of a real trauma.
The ethical dilemma for the traumatised polis of Lower Manhattan can be represented in terms of
three alternative future worlds or three distinct political scenarios as follows:
(i) America will continue to develop its habit of political isolationism, business as usual, and
continue fighting its wars against incompatible economies in foreign cities. Let us call this scenario
“fortress America”. From today’s perspective it appears perhaps the most likely to occur.
(ii) Terrorism will become a fact of life in all modern cities including other American cities – Ground
Zero will no longer be a singular event but only the first of a succession of sites of random
violence. We could describe this future world scenario as “battlefield America”. It is the vision that
Sorkin anticipated in 2003. Cities will become “war-fighting eco-systems” stripped of their character
as human settlements and recast instead as “target sets” and “habitats of devils”.
(iii) It may be that America will find a way to stop dreading the terrorist threat. America will
undertake to work with other powers and the United Nations to spread genuine democracy and
development throughout the world, incidentally placating the demands of the terrorists but more
6

importantly reinstating justice in the cities of other disadvantaged and terrorized nations. This third
scenario could be called “pax americana”. Something like it certainly emerged in the classical world
subsequent to the Battle of Atrium (and subsequent also, if not consequent, to the writing of Arius
Didymus.)
So what do we make of Daniel Libeskind’s response to the “unimaginable hole where the World
Trade Centre used to stand”? First of all I should note that Michael Sorkin’s criticism of the
Libeskind scheme is most pointedly ad hominem. Perhaps it is inevitable that modern ethical
criticism has to be couched in intersubjective terms. Sorkin criticises “Libeskind’s sleeve-worn
heart, [the] treacly recitations of his immigrant sagas, [and] the sudden appearance of an American
Flag in his chic lapel” (Sorkin 2003). This latter, Libeskind’s choice of lapel pin may come as no
surprise since all of the future worlds for Ground Zero that I can imagine are American futures.
Libeskind’s master plan design according to his own description (Libeskind 2003) is organised
around three spatial concepts or architectural ideas. The first is a proposition for “the world’s tallest
spire”. He says it is his gift to every migrant’s sense of arrival, and that it will serve as an
introduction to the proud skyline of New York. Secondly the reinstated transportation hub under the
site of Ground Zero is to be covered over by a “park of heroes” which Libeskind says will serve as
a reminder of the devastation and a memorial to those who died in it. Thirdly, to mark the singular
events of September 11, Libeskind proposes to have a “wedge of light”, a device admittedly I do
not fully comprehend, whereby sunlight will strike the memorial park precisely on the day and on
the hour of the terrorist impact. This latter idea is oddly reminiscent of the imperator Augustus’s
famous design for the Ara Pacis which was built on the Campus Martius in Rome, a work that
commemorated the emperor by causing the shadow of the sun to strike the door to his family
memorial at sunset on the day of his birth. The Ara Pacis of course also memorialised the
commencement of pax romana.
Each of these spatial concepts at Ground Zero is an ethical response to alternative future worlds.
In that world which will see “fortress America”, and Lower Manhattan returning to business as
usual, then the very tall and graceful feminised figure on the skyline will serve as a lonely gesture
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of hope to strangers, a sign that their new homeland is not entirely dominated by xenophobic
monsters. Libeskind compares the tower to that other famous ethical icon, the Statue of Liberty.
In the world in which global terrorism and “battleground America” prevails then Lower Manhattan
will have its own memorial to heroism in the “park of Heroes”. It will be one among many sites of
devastation strewn across all the cities of the world.
In the possible world that is “pax americana”, the unique memorial with its “wedge of light” will
acquire an historical association with the Ara Pacis in Rome. Libeskind’s work will come to be seen
as prophetic in the sense of having promoted the unlikely possibility of a new world order.
There is not a 1-1 correspondence between the three spatial propositions and the three alternative
futures. This is because the ideas will all occur together in the architecture when eventually it is
built, but the alternative worlds are in effect incompossible. Only one real world will actually occur
in the long run. If fortress America prevails then the garden of remembrance will be too much
valued as a public park and the “grid-iron” forces of urbanism will not be able to erase this singular
monument to the history of Manhattan. If terrorism prevails then Manhattan’s skyscrapers will
become too dangerous to conduct business as usual. Multistorey buildings will become a thing of
the past. Then this vacated female figure on the skyline will read as a final irony or perhaps a
distant symbol of hope. If pax americana prevails then the composition as a whole will be read as
part of the proud tradition of architecture of an ethical city.
By devising and constraining the options for the design in the way that he has done, Daniel
Libeskind has produced an ethical response to a traumatic abyss which has opened both in the
political space and in the architectural imagination of the modern world. McCall’s model of many
worlds places at our disposal a realistic tool with which we can begin to negotiate a rational
judgment about this design in its own terms and in terms of the multiple futures that Ground Zero
opens before us.
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